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Abstract
Background: Outbreak investigation is a core function of public health agencies. Suboptimal
outbreak investigation endangers both public health and agency reputations. While audits of clinical
medical and nursing practice are conducted as part of continuous quality improvement, public
health agencies rarely make systematic use of structured audits to ensure best practice for
outbreak responses, and there is limited guidance or policy to guide outbreak audit.
Methods: A framework for prioritising which outbreak investigations to audit, an approach for
conducting a successful audit, and a template for audit trigger questions was developed and trialled
in four foodborne outbreaks and a respiratory disease outbreak in Australia.
Results: The following issues were identified across several structured audits: the need for clear
definitions of roles and responsibilities both within and between agencies, improved
communication between agencies and with external stakeholders involved in outbreaks, and the
need for development of performance standards in outbreak investigations - particularly in relation
to timeliness of response. Participants considered the audit process and methodology to be clear,
useful, and non-threatening. Most audits can be conducted within two to three hours, however,
some participants felt this limited the scope of the audit.
Conclusion: The framework was acceptable to participants, provided an opportunity for clarifying
perceptions and enhancing partnership approaches, and provided useful recommendations for
approaching future outbreaks. Future challenges include incorporating feedback from broader
stakeholder groups, for example those of affected cases, institutions and businesses; assessing the
quality of a specific audit; developing training for both participants and facilitators; and building a
central capacity to support jurisdictions embarking on an audit. The incorporation of measurable
performance criteria or sharing of benchmark performance criteria will assist in the standardisation
of outbreak investigation audit and further quality improvement.
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Outbreak investigation is a core function of public health
agencies. Suboptimal outbreak investigation endangers
both public health and agency reputations. Surprisingly,
there is little guidance on enhancing the quality of out-
break investigation and control provided to public health
agencies. Audits of clinical medical and nursing practice
are conducted as part of continuous quality improvement
and particularly where significant events have occurred,
such as unexpected deaths[1]. They are sometimes
referred to as "clinical audits", "morbidity and mortality
meetings", "critical event auditing" or "facilitated case dis-
cussions". Such audits are undertaken to identify ways of
improving practice by identifying barriers to best practice,
highlighting exemplary practice, and for debriefing staff
after a particularly stressful incident.
While recommendations for practice improvement in out-
break investigation may be found in the discussion sec-
tion of journal articles reporting on outbreak responses
and published reports may critique limited aspects of out-
break response performance, a comprehensive review of
outbreak investigation practice often only follows high
profile events subjected to an independent government
audit, or a coronial inquiry[2-5]. Public health agencies
should make more systematic use of structured audits to
ensure best practice for all outbreak responses, but there is
limited guidance or policy development for outbreak
audit[6].
A framework for prioritising which outbreak investiga-
tions to audit and how to conduct an audit of outbreak
investigation practice is presented. The application of this
approach in four foodborne outbreaks and a respiratory
disease outbreak in an Australian context is reviewed.
Methods
The audit methodology has evolved since its initial trial
during a national workshop to test outbreak response
guidelines in 1997 which focused primarily on the ration-
ale, selection of outbreaks, and development and use of
the Audit Trigger Questions 1 in the context of a multi-
state outbreak[7,8]. It has been refined and trialled more
extensively since 2005 when dispute resolution principles
were integrated into the methods - not because the proc-
ess inherently involves conflict but to prevent the devel-
opment of conflict and create an environment in which
the mutual interests of all parties can best be
addressed[9,10].
The success of a structured audit is dependent upon the
appropriate:
• Selection of outbreaks to be audited
• Engagement and preparation of stakeholders
• Process of the audit
• Confidentiality agreement, where necessary
• Implementation and dissemination of recommen-
dations
Selection of outbreaks to be audited
Public health activities should be evaluated as part of
quality assurance and outbreaks almost always hold les-
sons for service improvement. However, some outbreaks,
characterised by criteria in Table 1, may be worthy of
more comprehensive and detailed audit. In our experi-
ence outbreaks should be audited within six months of
the resolution of the outbreak to optimise recollection of
events.
A benefit of normalising structured audit as part of routine
practice is that audits associated with inter-jurisdictional
conflict will be less threatening to stakeholders if the proc-
ess is regarded as routine. It is important that audits not
only be conducted following perceived system "failures"
but also to identify and promote good practice. Ideally,
agencies responsible for outbreak investigation should
audit at least one or two investigations annually, even
where specific selection criteria are not satisfied, as there
can be significant learning from small or "routine" inves-
tigations.
While there are costs involved in conducting a structured
audit, proactively addressing communication and system
performance issues may well be cost saving from an
organisational perspective, however, awareness of the
opportunity costs involved in conducting an audit should
influence the careful selection of outbreaks to be audited
and the efficient conduct of the audit. We believe most
structured audits can be conducted within two to three
hours and should be restricted to this time limit.
Engagement and preparation of stakeholders
It is essential that the focus of the audit is on improving
future practice rather than on laying blame or identifying
individual people or agencies for criticism. Participants
may have endured a stressful experience during the out-
break period and extensive media scrutiny. In some out-
break investigations, legal and media scrutiny can lead to
criticism of key personnel investigating outbreaks. Staff
may be sensitive to an audit of their work. It is important
that all participants come to the audit with the expectation
of a positive outcome that will improve future practice,
rather than fearing further criticism.Page 2 of 8
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ers who can assist in the process of the audit or those
who's future practice will benefit from participation
including both higher level managers and frontline staff.
Including participants from external but collaborative
agencies will bring more divergent viewpoints to the audit
and extend the range of issues explored and resolutions
available. We have conducted audits with up to 20 partic-
ipants, however, the number of participants should be
balanced with the scope of the audit, the issues to be
reviewed and the time available.
Generally, it is preferable to use a skilled facilitator. Using
an external facilitator has the advantage of independence
and bringing a fresh perspective. However, an external
facilitator may not know the roles of key people and agen-
cies involved in the outbreak response. A facilitator
should have some experience of outbreak investigation
but their key expertise should be in the process of facilita-
tion. The facilitator should ensure constructive framing of
discussion and reorient interpersonal conflict to address
system issues if possible through interest-based negotia-
tion that focuses on the underlying interest of the parties
rather than their competing claims or positions[10].
The facilitator is responsible for 1) explaining the aims,
ground rules, and principles of the audit, 2) maintaining
the structure of the audit, 3) facilitating the process
including seeking agreement on key themes and scope of
the audit, encouraging contributions broadly across par-
ticipants, managing time, clarifying and summarising
issues, clarifying assumptions, 4) maintaining an impar-
tial perspective, 5) summarising the outcome of the audit
and assisting in writing a report, and 6) checking on
progress of actions approximately six weeks after the
audit.
Process of the audit
Preparing for the Structured Audit
The lead agency in the investigation will usually call for an
audit of an investigation and define the expectations of
the audit outcome at the outset. The terms of reference,
the scope of the audit, attendees, duration and the
expected product should be defined in consultation with
participants and in advance so that participants are sup-
portive and prepared for the meeting. The major objective
of the audit should be framed as a neutral system perform-
ance statement or question.
We use the term "structured" to describe two aspects of
this methodology - first to denote the structure used in the
Audit Trigger Questions to ensure a comprehensive range
of issues are addressed and secondly to denote the struc-
ture for audit meeting preparation and conduct. The Audit
Trigger Questions (Additional file 1) may be used to sug-
gest specific areas for review. Since an outbreak is a public
health emergency, the four categories of prevention/miti-
gation, preparedness, response, and recovery from emer-
Table 1: Criteria for selecting outbreaks for audit.
Criteria Example/Details
Outbreak of local, state, national or international significance Multi-state outbreaks
Disease reported internationally
Exotic/emerging diseases
Highly virulent pathogens in terms of death/hospitalisation or high attack rate
Tourist facilities
National coordination required
Unusual outbreaks Large outbreaks
New epidemiological or laboratory methods
Complex epidemiological investigations
Special learning opportunities, eg rare pathogen or unusual mode of transmission
System issues Timeliness of epidemiological, environmental or laboratory response
Demonstrated failure of routine public health practice
Perceived failure of health protection standards or protocols
Inter-jurisdictional communication challenges
Complex outbreak coordination
Cultural differences between jurisdictions/agencies
Stress among investigating team members
Legal or Administrative Litigation or administrative review of decision making
Public/Media concern A high degree of community concern about the outbreak. Confidentiality provisions 
should be considered.Page 3 of 8
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Trigger Questions to encourage the entire spectrum of
response to be considered (Additional file 1). The catego-
ries used in the Audit Trigger Questions can also be used
to prepare a post audit action plan to document actions
and responsibilities (Additional file 2). Reviewing the
questions can be time consuming and is best conducted
separately by participants to ensure a wide range of issues
are considered. Each party forwards their priority issues to
the facilitator who reviews the issues raised for concord-
ance with the terms of reference and scope of the audit
and prepares a final list of issues for discussion and a brief
summary of the outbreak to provide context.
For national outbreaks, state-based health agencies may
conduct mini-audits among local health agencies in their
own jurisdiction and contribute their findings to a
national audit. A focus on the perceived "failings" of a sin-
gle agency or unit should be avoided.
In summary, prior to the audit meeting the following
should be accomplished:
• The lead agency proposes the terms of reference and
scope of the audit
• The facilitator confirms and/or modifies terms of ref-
erence and scope of audit in consultation with the par-
ticipants.
• All participants/organisations should submit issues
for review based on the Audit Trigger Questions (Addi-
tional file 1).
• The facilitator reviews issues and compiles a list of
discussion points
• The facilitator circulates the list of discussion points,
statement of scope, and brief summary of outbreak to
audit attendees and other stakeholders.
Conducting the Audit Meeting
Audits begin with an exploration of issues (Figure 1), dur-
ing which summary information on the outbreak is
shared with the group, along with feedback from the
Audit Trigger Questions review (Additional file 1).
This is followed by brainstorming in an open session in
which participants offer brief observations, uncensored
and unevaluated by self or others, on the conduct of the
outbreak without further discussion of the observations -
except for questions of clarification. All observations are
recorded and only after an agreed period, 10 to 20 min-
utes perhaps, are they evaluated and prioritised for more
interactive discussion. The emphasis is on openness and
creativeness. After the issues in the prioritised list are dis-
cussed in full, the parties then return to the first prioritised
issue and take turns at proposing solutions. The facilitator
assists by reframing negative statements into neutral or
positive language that reflects the parties interests rather
than their positions[10]. An example of reframing a state-
ment to identify interests rather than positions follows:
Party A: "Party B should not give advice to the facility,
it is our role not theirs."
Facilitator: "Can you tell Party B, more about your
experience of them giving advice to the facility and it's
impact?"
Party A: "We gave the facility different advice to Party
B and it caused confusion for the facility manager."
Facilitator: "So would it be accurate to say that your
main interest is to ensure that your agency and Party B
do not give conflicting advice to facilities during joint
investigations?"
Party A: "Yes, that would be accurate."
Facilitator: "Party B - would you share the same inter-
est in ensuring facilities were not given conflicting
Conduct of the audit meetingFigure 1
Conduct of the audit meeting. Begin with a broad explo-
ration of issues to ensure all views are heard; brainstorming 
without censure in the middle, and narrowing down to prac-
tical actions in the end.
Begin well with brainstorming 
Begin with broad brainstorming approach, celebrate 
successes, incorporate feedback from the Audit Trigger 
Questions, list issues without censure or debate. Do not 
discuss solutions until all issues are on the table. 
Options and recommendations for improvement 
are narrowed down and a set of actions are 
developed. 
Finish well with a list of practical actions 
Prioritise the issues which will be discussed in detail 
Work through each prioritised issue in turn. Page 4 of 8
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area?"
Focusing on system issues will often reveal that interper-
sonal conflict has its root in organisational systems. Occa-
sionally personality conflicts will be elevated to an
organisation level. Conflict is facilitated and amplified by
differences in organisational culture, legislation, structure
and political imperatives between jurisdictions. A lack of
clarity of roles, or the failure to clearly articulate and doc-
ument the respective roles of agencies in outbreak investi-
gations may manifest as interpersonal conflict. Where
there is conflict the audit process should not be seen as a
method for determining which group was right or wrong
or who performed well or poorly. The audit process
should be used to reorient damaging communication
styles and model effective communication techniques. In
this setting a skilled external facilitator may be needed to
encourage interest-based negotiation of contested issues
in an environment that allows stakeholders to hear and
express needs and concerns that were not able to be heard
during the urgent and often politically charged environ-
ment of an outbreak response[11].
It is important to resist the temptation to rush to propos-
ing solutions until all the issues have been articulated by
the stakeholders. All suggestions should be recorded, with
particular emphasis on practical solutions. When sugges-
tions are exhausted, the group should prioritise the action
items for discussion.
Where performance indicators or guidelines exist, for
example in agency outbreak response or disease control
manuals, these should be considered during the audit and
may be revised following the audit. As best practice has
not been formulated for many aspects of outbreak inves-
tigation the audit should aim to collect data which can be
used to define and describe best practice. This methodol-
ogy should contribute to more explicit quality standards
for outbreak investigation or at least an ability to bench-
mark against peers in terms of objective measures, for
example the timeliness of responses in outbreaks.
Confidentiality agreement
How reports of the audit will be prepared and their extent
of dissemination should be agreed by participants in
advance. Confidentiality may be important if participants
are to discuss the outbreak response freely. Barriers to best
practice should be identified, discussed, and recorded
without attributing blame. Records of the audit can be
made in such a way as not to identify agencies and person-
nel unnecessarily. The need for confidentiality must be
balanced against the ethical need to disseminate learnings
to broader stakeholder groups, and be understood in the
context of the relevant freedom of information and pri-
vacy legislation. Consideration may be given to the use of
the Chatham House Rule[12] in which information
derived from the meeting may be discussed in general
terms but the source of the information remains confiden-
tial.
Implementation and dissemination of recommendations
The recommendations from the audit should be concrete
and able to be implemented. The facilitator should con-
tact the participants after four to six weeks to review
progress on the agreed actions, exploring any barriers or
difficulties that can be overcome. Additional file 2 pro-
vides a template for organising an accountable report of
the audit to assist in implementation of the recommenda-
tions. Publishing a final report of the findings and recom-
mendations will assist future public health practice
improvements locally and dissemination via the web or in
the peer-reviewed literature and through presentation at
public health grand rounds will enhance learning more
broadly.
A brief evaluation following the most recent two struc-
tured audits allowed each participant to provide written
feedback on the following questions: 1) was the process/
methodology clear? 2) did the structured methodology
assist or inhibit the debrief? 3) do you have any sugges-
tions for the facilitator to improve facilitation of debriefs
in the future? and 4) other general comments.
Results
Five outbreaks have undergone structured audit between
1997 and 2008, with participants ranging from a single
regional health protection unit through to inter-agency
and multi-jurisdictional audits. These identified a broad
range of outbreak response quality improvement meas-
ures at national, state and local level (Table 2).
We trialled qualitatively rating outbreak investigation per-
formance against the Audit Trigger Questions using crite-
ria such as "adequate" or "needs improvement", however,
it was found to be cumbersome and slowed down the
preparation for the audit and subsequently this was
dropped in favour of placing a tick beside those questions
that should be addressed in the audit.
Initial results from confidential written evaluations from
eight participants from the last two structured audits dem-
onstrate that participants consider the process and meth-
odology to be clear and useful. Some participants find
that while the structure of the audit assists and helps to
make the process "neutral" and "non-threatening" it may
also limit the discussion of issues that arise during the
audit because these are considered "out of scope". The cir-
culation of a document summarising the outbreak, the
scope of the audit and issues suggested for discussionPage 5 of 8
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gested that where possible the facilitator should be a neu-
tral party and that sometimes limiting the audit to two
hours inhibited exploration of issues such as future pre-
vention measures.
Discussion
The following issues were repeatedly identified across sev-
eral structured audits: the need for clear definitions of
roles and responsibilities both within and between agen-
cies, communication between agencies and with external
stakeholders involved in outbreaks, and the need for
development of performance standards in outbreak inves-
Table 2: Characteristics and key issues identified using the structured audit methodology in Australia.
Outbreak Response Participants Key Issues Identified for Improvement*
Multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Mbandaka 
associated with contaminated peanut butter, 
Australia,1995[7,8]
State and territory communicable disease and 
laboratory heads.
Need for national coordination of outbreaks 
and clarification of national and jurisdictional 
roles.
Need for national laboratory network to 
provide rapid subtyping of isolates.
Development of performance standards for 
timeliness of outbreak response.
Influenza outbreaks in aged-care facilities, New 
South Wales, 2005 [13].
Regional health protection staff and Federal 
health department aged-care accreditation staff
Identify a coordinator to facilitate 
communication between all stakeholders - 
facilities, state and federal agencies.
Develop standard surveillance case definitions, 
notification triggers, and national guidelines for 
influenza control in aged-care facilities.
Clarify roles of general practitioners in 
outbreaks.
Promotion of influenza immunisation in aged-
care staff and residents.
Need for broadcast facsimile capacity to aged-
care facilities.
Need for daily communication with affected 
families during quarantine.
Prophylaxis of contacts of food handler with 
hepatitis A to prevent an outbreak, NSW, 
2006.**
Regional health protection staff Promote early notification of hepatitis from 
laboratories and general practitioners.
Need for coordination of communication and 
liaison with other agencies e.g. schools and 
food safety authority.
Ensure roles of all staff are clear and 
documented in rapidly evolving outbreak 
responses.
Development of fact sheets and mass 
vaccination procedures.
Salmonella outbreak in an aged-care facility, 
NSW, 2008.**
Regional health protection staff and food safety 
authority
Develop guidelines for appropriate 
investigation timelines and share them between 
agencies.
Document roles of each agency and agree on 
and share communicated advice in each 
outbreak setting.
Salmonella outbreak in a restaurant, NSW, 
2008.**
Regional health protection staff and food safety 
authority
Develop protocols for joint health and food 
authority investigations with clarification of 
roles and legal status.
Need for rapid sharing of new epidemiological 
or environmental investigation information.
Interagency governance procedures identified 
for reporting and implementing 
recommendations from structured outbreak 
audits.
*Selected issues only. ** Unpublished internal reports Hunter New England Population HealthPage 6 of 8
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response.
The methodology used in the audit is acceptable to partic-
ipants and there is support for continued use and develop-
ment of the tool. We have found that the focus on
common interests of the parties, positive reframing of
issues, and compliance with the structure of the audit has
minimised the potential for interpersonal conflict during
the audit meetings. Agencies welcome guidance in
approaching the evaluation of complex outbreak
responses and this methodology has been chosen by the
Public Health Laboratory Network of Australia to review
the laboratory response to the 2009 influenza pandemic.
The methodology for the audit has evolved over time,
while it was initially structured around the Audit Trigger
Questions in Additional file 1, the process has been
increasingly informed by mediation or alternative dispute
resolution principles which assist in the open exploration
of issues in a non-judgemental environment and prevents
premature decisions on solutions before underlying sys-
tems issues are fully explored[11].
The importance of a supportive environment for struc-
tured audit cannot be over emphasised. In clinical audit,
the most frequently cited barrier to successful clinical
audit is the failure of organisations to provide sufficient
protected time for healthcare teams and it likely the same
would apply to public health agencies[1]. In our experi-
ence, as in clinical audit, there is a need for an organisa-
tional commitment to implement the recommendations
that flow from an audit as the good intentions of the audit
participants may not be sufficient for organisational
change. Organisations may benefit from formally incor-
porating audit reports into an established reporting proc-
ess for quality improvement or risk management[1]. This
may require reporting audit outcomes and organisational
commitments to a higher executive level to promote
accountability, a practice recently adopted in the local
audits conducted.
Kipping et al highlighted the lack of published standards
for auditing outbreak response and emphasised that fur-
ther development and promotion of such standards was
required[6].
This methodology is evolving with practice and we
encourage feedback and modification of the process from
practitioners. Future challenges include incorporating
feedback from broader stakeholder groups, for example
those of affected cases, institutions and businesses; assess-
ing the quality of audit; developing training for both par-
ticipants and facilitators; and building a central capacity
to support jurisdictions conducting audits. The incorpora-
tion of measurable performance criteria or sharing of
benchmarkable performance criteria will assist in the
standardisation of audit and further quality improve-
ment. A Google Group has been initiated at http://
groups.google.com/group/outbreak-audits to promote
use of the methodology and the development of a collab-
orative network to share learning and modifications of the
structured audit methodology.
Conclusion
The framework was acceptable to participants, provided
an opportunity for clarifying perceptions and enhancing
partnership approaches, and provided useful recommen-
dations for approaching future outbreaks. Future chal-
lenges include incorporating feedback from broader
stakeholder groups, for example those of affected cases,
institutions and businesses; assessing the quality of a spe-
cific audit; developing training for both participants and
facilitators; and building a central capacity to support
jurisdictions embarking on an audit. The incorporation of
measurable performance criteria or sharing of benchmark
performance criteria will assist in the standardisation of
outbreak investigation audit and further quality improve-
ment.
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